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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
— 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 — 
VERLORA CARLTON, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : APPELLANTS BRIEF 
v. : 
FRANK HAYDEN CARLTON, : Case No. 860247-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
— 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 — 
PARTIES 
The only parties to this appeal are the husband and wife 
identified in the caption of the case, whose marriage was terminated by the 
Decree of Divorce from which this appeal is taken. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal of the property distribution entered by the 
District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Jay E. Banks presiding. At the time of the 
filing of this appeal, the Utah Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 9, of the Constitution of the State of Utah, 
Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), and Rule 3 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Appellant was notified by letter dated 
January 28, 1987, from the Clerk of the Court of Appeals that this case had 
been assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the trial court err in failing to enter Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law sufficient to identify and evaluate the parties' 
respective pre-marital assets? 
2. Did the trial court err in failing to enter Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law having sufficient specificity to permit a determination 
of the parties5 marital estate as distinguished from their respective pre-
marital assets? 
3. Did the trial court err in awarding a substantial portion of 
Appellant's pre-marital assets to Respondent in the absence of any special 
circumstances or unique factors justifying such an award? 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is a divorce action involving a 5-1/2 year marriage Between 
older parties. There were no children born during the marriage. A two-day 
trial was held before the Honorable Jay E. Banks on December 18 and 19, 
1985, at the conclusion of which the trial court took the matter under 
advisement. More than six months later, the trial judge announced his ruling 
to counsel in an unreported conference in chambers. Proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law were prepared by Respondent's counsel 
(R. at 184-194), and objected to by Appellant's counsel (R. at 175-177). 
Thereafter, the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were 
entered by the trial court without modification on August 22, 1986, together 
with the Decree of Divorce (R. at 195-200). This appeal is from the property 
distribution provisions of the Decree. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married June 13, 1979, in Garden City, Utah. 
(R. at 260.) The marriage ended just 5-1/2 years later in December of 1984 
(R. at 260), when Defendant-Appellant Frank Hayden Carlton (hereinafter 
"Mr. Carlton") returned from a business trip to Wyoming to discover that 
Plaintiff-Respondent Verlora Carlton (hereinafter "Mrs. Carlton") had filed a 
Complaint for divorce and left their residence, taking all of her belongings 
with her (R. at 386). Both parties had been married several previous times 
and had children from those prior marriages (R. at 330); however, no children 
were born as issue of the marriage (R. at 260). 
Prior to the marriage, Mrs. Carlton was a cosmetologist in 
Saratoga, Wyoming, where she operated a beauty shop. (R. at 264.) During 
the two years prior to the marriage, she had realized gross earnings of just 
under $1,100.00 per month. (R. at 340.) At the time of trial, Mrs. Carlton 
was 49 years of age. (R. at 330-31.) 
On the other hand, Mr. Carlton was, at the time of trial, a few 
days away from his 65th birthday. (R. at 331.) Throughout the marriage, he 
was a certified public accountant (R. at 385) with an arduous practice 
(R. at 385), which serviced approximately 600 clients (R. at 441). 
The parties agreed at the time of their marriage that they would 
each keep their own property separate (R. at 389) and at the time of the 
divorce each still had their property in their own separate names. 
Mrs. Carlton acknowledged at trial that Mr. Carlton was "very private" about 
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his financial affairs (R. at 275), and acknowledged that they did not discuss 
his assets prior to the marriage (R. at 272), noting that she first learned the 
details of his holdings from the financial declaration that he filed in the 
divorce proceedings (R. at 272). 
In preparation for the marriage, Mrs. Carlton sold her beauty 
shop business in Wyoming, receiving approximately $7,000.00 for it. 
(R. at 265.) She also sold a house that she had been purchasing in Wyoming, 
from which she netted $10,000.00. (R. at 266.) She also brought to the 
marriage a 1977 Cordoba, with a value of approximately $4,000.00, and an IRA 
account with a balance of slightly less than $4,000.00. (R. at 266.) The 
assets that Mrs. Carlton held, at the time of, and at the conclusion of, the 
marriage were detailed in Exhibit 26-D (received R. at 335, reproduced infra 
at A-23). In total, Mrs. Carlton brought into the marriage slightly less than 
$25,000.00. 
On the other hand, Mr. Carlton brought assets to the marriage 
having an aggregate value of more than $750,000.00. (R. at 418.) These 
assets included a duplex located on "K" Street in Salt Lake City, in which the 
parties resided (R. at 271), land with a summer home on Bear Lake in Rich 
County (R. at 139-141), and various securities (R. at 396). The specific assets 
brought into the marriage by Mr. Carlton, as well as the specific assets held 
by him at the end of the marriage, were detailed in Exhibit 35-D (received. 
R. at 135, reproduced infra at A-26). 
The appraiser called at trial by Mrs. Carlton, Robert R. Terrell, 
testified that he was of the opinion that the MKM Street property had a value 
at the time of trial of $122,500.00 (R. at 296); similarly, Jerry R. Webber, a 
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professional appraiser called by Mr, Carlton, testified that it was his opinion 
that the "K" Street property had a value at the time of trial of $122,000.00 
(R. at 408). While the two appraisers had no real dispute as to the value of 
the "K!f Street property at the time of the trial, they did not agree as to its 
value at the time of the marriage. Mr. Terrell testified that he felt the 
property had a value of $95,000.00 in June of 1979 (R. at 296), but could 
offer no specific comparable sales on which he based this opinion (R. at 299). 
Mr. Webber, on the other hand, based upon four specific comparables, 
including two sales that he had personally been involved with, testified that, 
in his opinion, the property would have been worth $116,000.00 in June of 
1979. (R. at 408.) There was no evidence of any changes or improvements to 
the property during the marriage. 
With respect to the Bear Lake property, Mr. Carlton testified 
without contradiction that the property had been worth $300,000.00 at the 
time of the marriage. (R. at 396.) He based that figure, in part, upon the 
fact that he had received an offer in that amount from a realtor at about the 
time of the marriage. (R. at 396.) He testified, also without contradiction, 
that by the time of the trial, the value of the Bear Lake property had 
declined to $200,000.00 because of adverse economic conditions in the area. 
(R. at 395.) 
During the marriage, inflation as measured by the Consumer Price 
Index caused a substantial diminution in the purchasing value of the dollar, so 
that each dollar of value held by the parties at the termination of their 
marriage was worth less than 69 cents when compared with the dollars they 
held at the time of their marriage. (See. Exhibit 30-D, received R. at 335, 
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reproduced infra at A-24.) Without taking this very real loss of purchasing 
power into account, Mr. Carlton's assets appreciated by approximately 
$75,000,00 during the marriage, (See. Exhibit 35-D, reproduced infra at 
A-26.) It was Mr. Carlton's uncontradicted testimony at trial that his assets 
"just sat accumulating value on their own without further investment" during 
the marriage (R. at 397); in other words, the increase in the gross value of 
his assets was due to passive appreciation rather than active management. 
Mrs. Carlton did not work during the marriage; instead, she was 
able to accompany Mr. Carlton on the substantial amount of traveling that he 
did in connection with his activities with the National Society of Public 
Accountants. (R. at 297.) These activities took the parties to fine hotels 
and nice resort areas, with many pleasant activities. (R. at 348.) Because of 
her husband's employment and the opportunities that it afforded, Mrs. Carlton 
enjoyed the pleasure of activities not available to her prior to the marriage. 
(R. at 348.) 
During 1984, Mr. Carlton's professional employment provided an 
average net monthly income of slightly more than $5,000.00, although he 
estimated that his 1985 income would be reduced, due to his advancing age 
and employee problems within his office. (R. at 386-88.) At the time of 
trial, Mrs. Carlton was earning $800.00 per month. (R. at 327.) She testified 
that while she was in good health and possessed both a degree in cosmetology 
and a Wyoming cosmetology license, she did not want to return to Wyoming 
because "the economy went bad" (R. at 339) and "there is a beauty shop on 
every corner" in Wyoming (R. at 352). She acknowledged that she could 
obtain a Utah cosmetology license by taking a five-hour test (R. at 341-42) 
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but admitted that she had not done so prior to the time of trial (R. at 342), 
which was a year after the parties' separation. 
Mrs. Carlton acknowledged that during the year's separation prior 
to trial, she had received more than $21,000.00 in cash from Mr. Carlton by 
way of temporary support. (R. at 328.) From the time of trial through 
June 2, 1986, when a hearing was held before Judge Banks on Mr. Carlton's 
motion to terminate the temporary alimony based upon the allegation that 
Mrs. Carlton was cohabiting with a male, an additional $8,000.00 in temporary 
support was paid to her. Additionally, she still had in her name assets 
totaling just over $22,000.00, which she had acquired with the proceeds of her 
Wyoming business and home (R. at 333 and see Exhibit 26-D, reproduced infra 
at A-23). Mrs. Carlton also acknowledged at trial that, during the marriage, 
she had spent "quite a bit" of money on her children from previous marriages. 
(R. at 333.) 
Having taken the matter under advisement on December 19, 1985, 
at the conclusion of the second day of trial, Judge Banks did not rule on this 
matter until July 11, 1986, some five weeks after the June 2, 1986, hearing on 
Mr. Carlton's motion to terminate the temporary support based upon 
Mrs. Carlton's alleged cohabitation. More than a month later, without the 
benefit of either a written memorandum decision or a reporter's transcript, 
Judge Banks notified the parties' counsel of his decision. Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law were prepared by Mrs. Carlton's counsel and entered 
by Judge Banks over Mr. Carlton's objections (R. at 184-194). The resulting 
Decree, after allowing Mr. Carlton various offsets and credits based upon 
numbers appearing in the Findings, awarded Mrs. Carlton judgment for an 
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additional $129,246.00 above and beyond the $22,041.00 in assets and 
approximately $30,000.00 in temporary support that she had already received 
from this 5-1/2-year marriage to which she had contributed less than 
$25,000.00. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The assets of these parties at the time of trial were substantial 
and derived largely from pre-marital assets. It was necessary, therefore, for 
the trial court to inventory and value the assets that the parties brought into 
the marriage and to determine which, if any, of the assets owned by the 
parties at the time of the termination of the marriage constituted marital 
assets acquired through the joint efforts of the parties as opposed to 
representing merely pre-marital assets albeit in possibly changed form. Under 
such circumstances, Utah law required the trial court to make specific 
Findings of Fact as to the extent and value of the parties' assets both at the 
time of their marriage and at the termination of that marriage. 
The trial court erred in failing to make Findings of Fact having 
sufficient specificity reasonably to enable the trial court to determine the 
nature of the parties' various assets (i.e., marital or pre-marital) and the 
value of those various assets. Not only were the Findings of Fact entered by 
the trial court insufficient to permit the trial court to draw this critical 
distinction, they are totally inadequate to permit this Court to review the 
propriety of the property distribution attempted by the trial court. 
Accordingly, this action must be remanded to the trial court for the entry of 
Findings of Fact having sufficient specificity to enable the trial court to 
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make an equitable distribution of the parties' assets and to enable this Court 
to review that distribution. 
The property distribution fashioned by the trial court is 
erroneous because it inequitably distributes to the Respondent wife a 
substantial portion of the Appellant husband's pre-marital assets. All of the 
factors consistently articulated by the Utah Supreme Court as bearing upon 
the distribution of pre-marital assets militate against the granting of any 
substantial portion of those assets to the wife under the facts of this case. 
The resulting property distribution is, therefore, inequitable and contrary to 
Utah law and must be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE 
REASONABLY SPECIFIC FINDINGS CONCERNING THE VALUES OF THE 
PARTIES' PRINCIPAL ASSETS. 
The central issue before the District Court in this action was the 
property distribution. In light of the fact that this was a short-term 
marriage between older parties and the fact that Mr. Carlton had extensive 
pre-marital assets, a determination of the values of the parties' assets both at 
the commencement and at the termination of the marriage was essential to a 
meaningful determination of the marital estate properly subject to 
distribution. 
Unfortunately, a review of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law entered by the District Court (reproduced infra at A-2 through 
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A-12) reveals that the District Court failed to make any specific 
determinations on these crucial issues, notwithstanding Mr. Carlton's objection 
(R. at 175-177, reproduced infra at A-19 through A-21) to the proposed 
Findings. For example, the District Court found that there had been "sizable 
appreciation" in the "K" Street duplex brought into the marriage by 
Mr. Carlton but made no effort either to place a value on that asset at the 
time of the marriage or to quantify the amount of the appreciation. 
(Findings of Fact, paragraph 9, R. at 187, infra at A-5.) As noted above in 
the Statement of Facts (supra at 4-5), there was substantial but contradictory 
expert testimony offered on this precise issue. 
Similarly, the District Court found that the parties had "acquired 
. . . personal property" during their marriage and noted that this property 
included "stocks and bonds in an investment account with E. F. Hutton 
Investment Company," but made no effort to determine either the separate or 
aggregate value of these securities. (Findings of Fact, paragraph 8, 
R. at 186, infra at A-4.) The trial court also found that the parties had 
accumulated "numerous bank accounts" and "certificates of deposit," but failed 
to further identify the accounts or place a value upon them. (Id.) The trial 
court also found that "accumulations to defendant's retirement account" had 
occurred during the marriage, but made no effort to determine the amount of 
those "accumulations." Nor did the trial court make any attempt to delineate 
which "accumulations" resulted from assets first acquired during the marriage 
as opposed to those resulting from the reinvestment or appreciation of pre-
marital assets. 
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In fact, the only effort the trial court made to place a value 
upon the parties' marital estate appears in the Finding to the effect that the 
"marital appreciation . . . totals $255,327.00." (Findings of Fact, 
paragraph 13, R. at 187, infra at A-5.) Significantly, while the figure 
mentioned by the trial court appears to have mathematical precision, it is an 
amount advocated by neither party and an amount which cannot be derived by 
any apparent mathematical manipulation of the values appearing in the 
testimony of the parties and trial exhibits. Since the trial court chose not to 
place values on the parties' assets at the relevant times, there exists no 
means by which the mathematically precise, yet inexplicable, figure of 
5255,327.00 can be reviewed or verified. 
The Utah Supreme Court requires that the trial judge in domestic 
relations matters involving property distribution enter Findings of Fact 
valuing the parties' assets at the relevant times so as to make meaningful 
appellate review possible. For example, in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 
(Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court was faced with an appeal from a 
property distribution in which there were "no findings of fact that fix[ed]" 
"the values . . . assigned to the various items of property included in the 
distribution." (700 P.2d at 1074.) Although the Utah Supreme Court 
recognized the "broad latitude" accorded to the trial court in domestic 
relations matters, it emphasized that "the trial court must exercise its 
discretion in accordance with the standards that have been set by this Court. 
(Id.) In language as applicable to the present case as to the case then before 
it, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
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On the present record, we cannot determine 
whether the trial court distributed the property 
equitably. . . . To avoid problems of this nature, we 
require that when one of the parties to a property 
distribution raises a serious question as to the value of 
one or more of the assets, the trial court's distribution 
of those assets should be based upon written findings of 
fact that will permit appellate review. . . . 
[TJhe gravamen of the [appellant's] claim here is that 
the distribution was inequitable. To determine whether 
equity was done, we must have before us specific 
findings on the facts pertinent to that issue. 
700 P.2d at 1074 (emphasis added, citations omitted). The Court went on to 
note that remand was generally the appropriate remedy when the trial court 
fails to enter sufficient Findings of Fact. Remand is the only available 
option in this case because the Findings of Fact are so totally inadequate 
that it is simply impossible to review the propriety of the trial court's 
distribution of the parties' marital assets. 
The Utah Supreme Court is by no means unique in its 
requirement of Findings from which the value of the parties' property can be 
determined. For example, in Martin v. Martin, 22 Wash. App. 295, 
588 P.2d 1235 (1979), as in the present case, it was clear from the record 
that a dispute existed between the parties and the witnesses called as to the 
value of the principal assets of the parties but the trial court failed to 
ascribe values to the various assets. On appeal, the court reversed and 
remanded, noting: 
[E]xcept for bank balances, the evidence is conflicting as 
to the value of the property. Neither the findings nor 
the conclusions attach a value to the various items of 
property awarded to the parties; nor does the court's 
oral decision contain any valuations. On this record, we 
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are unable to review the fairness of the property 
division. . . . 
588 P.2d at 1236. In the present case, the situation is even more serious 
because of the very substantial pre-marital assets that Mr. Carlton possessed 
and because the trial court failed to inventory and value even liquid assets 
such as bank accounts and listed securities. 
Similarly, in Robinson v. Robinson, 607 P.2d 550 (Mont. 1980), the 
trial court's decree and property distribution were reversed and remanded 
because the Findings failed to ascribe values to the assets distributed. The 
Montana Supreme Court held: 
[Wjithout the required findings we cannot tell how or 
why the trial court arrived at the apportionment of the 
marital estate in this case. The lack of findings is 
similarly deficient as to the personal property distributed 
by the trial court. 
Accordingly, the judgment is vacated . . . . 
607 P.2d at 551. See also. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 602 P.2d 175 (Mont. 1979) 
and Schultz v. Schultz, 613 P.2d 1022 (Mont. 1980). 
In the present case, the trial court held the matter under 
advisement for almost seven months after the trial before attempting to 
announce the ruling.1 Ironically, at an intervening hearing on Mr. Carlton's 
motion for relief from the temporary alimony, the trial judge recognized and 
expressed the quandary created by the delay: 
1
 Such action by the trial court was in direct violation of 
Section 78-7-25, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), which wisely 
requires that all matters taken under advisement be decided within sixty days 
except in extraordinary circumstances beyond the control of the judge. 
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Trouble is, when you take one under advisement, you get 
to looking at it and you get part of it there, and when 
you go back to review it, you have to go right back to 
scratch again and start over. 
Transcript, R. at 465. Unfortunately, in this case, the trial transcript was 
not prepared by the court reporter until long after the Findings had been 
prepared and entered. (R. at 468.) Thus, the trial court faced the impossible 
task of inventorying and evaluating numerous assets without the benefit of a 
clear recollection of the witnesses' testimony and with only the trial exhibits 
and, possibly, his own notes for guidance. 
The paucity of information contained within the formal Findings 
of Fact in this case is further exacerbated by the fact that the trial judge 
announced his ruling to counsel in chambers without a court reporter and 
without the benefit of a memorandum decision. Accordingly, the numerous 
questions left unanswered by the inadequate Findings of Fact cannot be 
clarified by recourse to either a verbal opinion or a memorandum decision of 
the trial court. 
Having failed to value the parties9 respective assets at the time 
of their marriage, the trial court was simply unable to distinguish between 
pre-marital assets and the marital estate. Since the trial court could not 
make this fundamental distinction, the trial court was totally unable to 
distribute in a fair and equitable manner the assets held by the parties at the 
termination of their marriage. 
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POINT II. SUCH FINDINGS AS THE TRIAL COURT DID MAKE ARE 
UNSUPPORTED BY, OR EVEN CONTRARY TO, THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED 
AT TRIAL. 
Not only are the Findings entered by the trial court in this 
matter not specific as required by Utah law (see Point I, supra at 9), many of 
the Findings are either contrary to the evidence presented at trial or totally 
illogical. For example, the trial court found that Mrs. Carlton "brought into 
the marriage . . . a 1977 Cordova [sic] automobile; real property located at 
Saratoga, Wyoming; [and] a hair business and equipment . . . ." (Findings of 
Fact, paragraph 6, R. at 186, infra at A-4.) This finding is totally 
inconsistent with the unrefuted testimony of Mrs. Carlton herself at trial. 
The parties were married June 18, 1979. (R. at 260.) It was Mrs. Carlton's 
testimony that, prior to that time, she sold her business and home in 
Wyoming: 
Mr. Liapis: And what happened between October of 
'78 and your marriage in June of '79 
with regard to your relationship? 
Mrs. Carlton: Well, it grew. It - he proposed to me. 
I agreed. I made arrangements to take 
care of my business and arranged for my 
family, and I moved to Utah in February 
of 1979. 
Q, What happened to your business in the 
state of Wyoming? 
A. I sold it, such as it was, and all it was 
was a leased building. I owned the 
equipment and stock. 
And how much did you receive from the 
sale of that business? 
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A. Right at $7,000. 
Q. Did you own anything else prior to vour 
move to Utah? 
A. I owned a house or was paying for a 
house. 
Q. And that was subsequently sold? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you have any other items? 
A. I had a '77 Cordoba. 
Q. What happened to the Cordoba? 
A. It was sold. 
Q. At approximately when? 
A. I believe I sold it in March. 
Transcript at 10-11. Thus, the Finding is contradicted by Mrs. Carlton's own 
unrefuted testimony at the trial. 
More significant are the defects in Paragraph 13 of the trial 
court's Findings of Fact. That Finding — which should, perhaps, more 
appropriately be characterized as a Conclusion — reads as follows: 
The Court finds that the marital appreciation in the 
assets which the parties acquired during the marriage 
and/or maintained during the marriage, totals $255,327.00. 
The Court finds that the Plaintiff brought into the 
marriage and should receive assets totaling $27,228.00, 
which sum should be taken away from the appreciated 
asset figure above, leaving an adjusted marital estate of 
$228,099.00. The Court further finds that the Plaintiff is 
entitled to one-half of said amounts, or $114,049.00. In 
addition, Plaintiff should have the value and assets she 
brought into the marriage of $27,228.00, for a total 
estate to be awarded to her of $141,277.00. 
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Findings, paragraph 13, R. at 187-88, reproduced infra at A-5 through 
A-6. 
As already noted in Point I, supra, since the trial court failed to 
value any of the parties' pre-marital assets, it is impossible to determine how 
the trial court calculated the $27,228.00 value it ascribed to Mrs. Carlton's 
pre-marital assets. A fortiorL it is impossible to review the accuracy of that 
determination. It should be noted, however, that the amount is not 
consistent with Mrs. Carlton's testimony, it is not consistent with the exhibit 
that she offered as illustrative of her testimony (Exhibit 12-P, reproduced 
infra at A-22), and it is not consistent with Mr. Carlton's testimony or the 
exhibit that he offered (see. Exhibit 26-D, reproduced infra at A-23). 
The still greater significance of the defects in Paragraph 13 of the 
trial court's Findings is the fact that the mathematical manipulations it 
contains are illogical and meaningless. Even assuming, arguendo, the accuracy 
of the dollar values, what logic or concept of domestic relations law justifies 
refunding to Mrs. Carlton her pre-marital assets from the "marital 
appreciation" determined by the trial court to have occurred? What 
significance is there to the figure (set by the trial court at $228,099.00) 
derived by deducting the wife's pre-marital assets from the "marital 
appreciation?" If the trial court's logic was that the wife should be awarded 
her pre-marital assets plus one-half of the appreciation that was realized by 
the parties during the marriage, then logic and equity would both require that 
the trial court inventory and value the husband's pre-marital assets so that 
they, together with the other half of the appreciation, could be awarded to 
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him. This, the trial court failed to do and in effect refused to do by 
"finding" that the undisputed $100,000.00 diminution in value that had been 
suffered by Mr. Carlton on his pre-marital Bear Lake property was irrelevant 
(see Findings, paragraph 20, R. at 189, infra at A-7) although the trial court 
apparently considered the concurrent appreciation in Mr. Carlton's "K" Street 
property to be relevant.2 
What the trial court should have done, and indeed was obligated to 
do in this case, was to inventory and value the pre-marital assets of each 
party at the time of the marriage, inventory and value the parties' total 
assets at the time of the termination of the marriage, and determine which of 
their assets had been produced during the marriage and which merely 
represented pre-marital assets, albeit in possibly changed form. Even though 
the evidence produced and offered to the trial court by both parties was 
sufficient to accomplish this task, the trial court's findings are totally 
inadequate either to have provided this critical information to the trial court 
or to permit this Court to review the distribution effected. Accordingly, the 
matter must be remanded for the determination and entry of the required, 
critical Findings. 
2
 Since the trial court appears — however erroneously — to have 
considered the passive appreciation in value realized with respect to the 
"KH Street property, logic and equity would both compel similar consideration 
of the depreciation that occurred in similar real property during precisely the 
same time frame. By erroneously considering the appreciation to be a marital 
asset and then ignoring the concurrent depreciation of similar assets, the trial 
court compounded its error. 
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POINT III. THE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION IS ERRONEOUS BECAUSE IT 
INEQUITABLY DISTRIBUTES TO THE WIFE A SUBSTANTIAL POR-
TION OF APPELLANT'S PRE-MARITAL ASSETS. 
While a precise review of the effect of the trial court's property 
distribution is not possible due to the defects in the Findings discussed in the 
preceding Points, it is apparent that the ultimate effect of the distribution is 
to award to Mrs. Carlton a substantial portion of Mr. Carlton's pre-marital 
assets. In addition to the $29,000.00 received by Mrs. Carlton in cash by way 
of temporary support, the trial court's Decree of Divorce awarded her another 
$141,277.00 in property settlement plus substantial personal property. (Decree, 
paragraph 10, R. at 198, reproduced infra at A-16.) Thus, from a 5-1/2-year 
marriage into which Mrs. Carlton brought assets aggregating less than 
$25,000.00 and during which she was at no time gainfully employed and during 
which she did not participate in the management of Mr. Carlton's substantial 
pre-marital financial holdings, the trial court has awarded her substantially 
more than $170,000.00. The net result is that the trial court has awarded 
Mrs. Carlton a substantial portion of Mr. Carlton's pre-marital assets. 
While the Utah Supreme Court has recognized the propriety of 
awarding to one spouse an equitable portion of appreciation that has occurred 
during the marriage attributable to the other spouse's pre-marital (or even 
inherited) assets, such awards have been consistently limited to those 
circumstances in which the appreciation in value has been attributable to the 
joint effort of the parties during the marriage. Similarly, while the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that a specific item of pre-marital property may be 
awarded to the non-contributing spouse if required by unusual circumstances, 
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the Utah Supreme Court has never permitted the award to one spouse of a 
substantial interest in either the other spouse's pre-marital assets or any 
passive appreciation occurring in such assets. In attempting to make such an 
award in this case, the trial court erred. 
In its very recent opinion in Burke v. Burke, — P.2d —, 
51 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court was faced with a 
challenge to the property distribution in a case factually very analogous to 
the present action. While the marriage in that case was of more than three 
times the duration of the marriage in this action, the parties had both been 
married previously and had children from those prior marriages. Unlike the 
present action, both parties engaged in full-time employment throughout the 
marriage. During the marriage, the wife inherited several acres of unimproved 
land. At the time she received the property, it was worth approximately 
$5,000.00; however, by the termination of the marriage, it had appreciated to 
more than $120,000.00. At trial, the wife's inherited property was awarded 
exclusively to her without any offsetting award to the husband on account of 
the more than $115,000.00 in appreciation that had occurred during the 
marriage. On appeal, the husband claimed that the appreciation in the 
property constituted a marital asset and that the trial court had erred in 
failing to award him any interest in that substantial marital asset. In 
rejecting this contention, the Utah Supreme Court began its analysis by 
emphasizing the fundamental goal of property distributions: 
[T]rial courts need to be guided by the general 
purpose to be achieved by a property distribution, which 
is to allocate the property in a manner which best serves 
the needs of the parties and best permits them to pursue 
their separate lives. 
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- P.2d at --, 51 Utah Adv. Rep. at 11 (footnote citation omitted). The Utah 
Supreme Court then proceeded to discuss the factors to be considered in 
fashioning an appropriate distribution of assets including those from pre- or 
extra-marital sources: 
Premarital property, gifts, and inheritances may be 
viewed as separate property, and in appropriate 
circumstances, equity will require that each party retain 
the separate property brought to the marriage. However, 
the rule is not invariable. In fashioning an equitable 
property distribution, trial courts need consider all of 
the pertinent circumstances. The factors generally to be 
considered are the amount and kind of property to be 
divided; whether the property was acquired before or 
during the marriage; the source of the property; the 
health of the parties; the parties' standard of living, 
respective financial conditions, needs, and earning 
capacity; the duration of the marriage; the children of 
the marriage; the parties' ages at time of marriage and 
of divorce; what the parties gave up by the marriage; 
and the necessary relationship the property distribution 
has with the amount of alimony and child support to be 
awarded. Of particular concern in a case such as this is 
whether one spouse has made any contribution toward 
the growth of the separate assets of the other spouse 
and whether the assets were accumulated or enhanced by 
the joint efforts of the parties. 
— P.2d at —, 51 Utah Adv. Rep. at 11 (emphasis added, footnote citations 
omitted). 
Having enumerated these factors, the Utah Supreme Court went on 
to apply them to the facts of the case then before it. At the outset, the 
Court noted that "except for having urged [the wife] to take her inheritance 
in land rather than cash, [the husband] concedes that he made no 
contribution towards the increase in value of the acreage in question and that 
the income came solely from the effects of inflation on land values." (Id.) 
Having found that the husband did not actively participate in either the 
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acquisition of the inherited property or the accumulation of the appreciation 
that occurred with respect to that property, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that the trial court had correctly denied him any interest in the wife's extra-
marital property and its appreciation. For precisely the same reason, the 
trial court in this case should have denied Mrs. Carlton any interest in 
Mr. Carlton's pre-marital property and the appreciation that occurred with 
respect to that property during the marriage. 
Another case in which the Utah Supreme Court reviewed a property 
distribution under facts very similar to those before this Court in the present 
case is Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982). In that case, the 
parties both had children from prior marriages and were married for 
approximately seven years. The only substantial factual difference between 
Preston and the present action is that, in Preston, the wife "brought 
substantial properties to the marriagew; whereas, in the present action, 
Mrs. Carlton brought relatively few assets to the marriage. During their 
marriage, in that case, the parties constructed a recreational cabin, which had 
a value at the time of trial of $34,000.00. The parties both jointly worked on 
the construction of the cabin but the evidence demonstrated that the husband 
contributed slightly more than $9,000.00 to the project from his pre-marital 
assets. The District Court divided the cabin equally between the parties. 
The husband appealed, contending that this distribution deprived him of the 
pre-marital property that he had contributed to the project. On appeal, the 
Utah Supreme Court agreed and reversed the trial court, holding: 
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[T]he husband should have been given credit for [his] 
$9,310.93 contribution {together with the proportion of 
appreciation in value attributable thereto) before the 
value of the cabin was divided between the parties. . . . 
646 P.2d at 706 (emphasis added, citations omitted). Thus, the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed the trial court's property distribution not only because it 
failed to restore to the husband his contribution of pre-marital assets but 
also because it failed to award to the husband the appreciation in value that 
had occurred during the marriage attributable to those assets. For these 
same reasons, the property distribution fashioned by the trial court in this 
action is erroneous. 
The Utah Supreme Court applied these same fundamental principles 
in Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980). That case, also, involved 
a relatively short-term marriage between older persons. The wife brought 
substantial cash assets to the marriage while the husband brought "virtually 
no assets." During the marriage, the parties purchased, with the wife's pre-
marital cash, a series of mobile homes which the husband renovated with his 
labor. Each was sold at a profit. Just prior to the end of the marriage, the 
parties sold for $27,000.00 a mobile home that they had purchased for 
$19,000.00. The trial court ordered that these funds, the parties' only 
substantial asset, be distributed so that the wife would be reimbursed for the 
$19,000.00 purchase price of the mobile home (on the theory that it had been 
purchased with her pre-marital assets), and that the wife would also receive 
77% of the remaining sales proceeds (on the theory that while the 
appreciation realized in the mobile home was due to the husband's labor, it 
was the wife's pre-marital assets that had made the acquisition of the asset 
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possible). The husband appealed, contending he was entitled to a greater 
share of the asset. The Utah Supreme Court rejected this contention, 
holding: 
In making a property division, a court may properly 
consider such things as the length of the marriage an<* 
parties' respective contributions to the marriage. This 
marriage lasted less than six years and no children issued 
therefrom. . . . [The husband] brought no assets into 
the marriage. . . . It was not unreasonable for the court 
to permit [the wife] to withdraw from the marital 
property the equivalent of those assets [she] brought into 
the marriage. All that may be considered to be marital 
property acquired through the joint efforts of the parties 
was therefore the proceeds from the sale of the [mobileJ 
home over and above its purchase price 
610 P.2d at 328 (footnote citation omitted, emphasis added). Even though, 
under the facts of the case then before it, the appreciation that had been 
realized in the pre-marital asset was attributable in substantial part to the 
labor of the non-contributing spouse (and therefore constituted a marital 
asset), the Utah Supreme Court emphasized the importance to be attached to 
the source of the contribution of the pre-marital asset itself: 
[I]t was [the wife's] financial ability alone that permitted 
the purchase of the mobile home. Except for said fact, 
there would have been no profits of sale to be divided. 
610 P.2d at 329. For exactly the same reason, except for Mr. Carlton's pre-
marital assets, there would have been no property to divide in this case. All 
of the factors articulated by the Utah Supreme Court militate, in the present 
case, against any award to Mrs. Carlton of Mr. Carlton's pre-marital assets. 
In attempting to make such an award, the trial court erred. 
Based upon the Utah Supreme Court's decisions in Burke, Preston, 
and Jesperson, discussed in the preceding paragraphs, it is apparent that the 
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factors to be considered by the trial court in connection with property 
distributions involving pre-marital assets primarily include the source of the 
property; whether it was acquired before or during the marriage; the health 
of the parties; their standard of living; the duration of the marriage; the 
number of children, if any, of the marriage; the parties' relative ages; any 
particular equities concerning what the parties may have given up by reason 
of the marriage; and whether the appreciation in the marital property was 
merely passive or was instead a result of the active efforts of the non-
contributing spouse. 
In the present case, the source of the substantial pre-marital assets 
was clearly Mr. Carlton. Although the trial court failed to specifically 
evaluate the assets, it is apparent that the overwhelming majority of the 
assets brought into this marriage came from Mr. Carlton. Those assets were 
acquired by him prior to the marriage. Significantly, it was his testimony at 
trial that these were assets that he "acquired over 40 years of work and 
practice" and that he had been accumulating them for his "retirement and the 
so-called golden years and as an estate for [his] children, their inheritance." 
(R. at 419.) Thus, the source-of-asset factor indicates that Mr. Carlton's 
pre-marital assets should have been restored to him. 
It was the undisputed testimony at trial that Mrs. Carlton was in 
good health (R. at 84), but that Mr. Carlton had a heart condition, high blood 
pressure, allergies, and asthma (R. at 132). While the parties were able to 
travel relatively frequently in connection with Mr. Carlton's work, it was his 
undisputed testimony that their lifestyle was "frugal" (R. at 135), a statement 
that was attested to in a dramatic fashion by the fact that during the five-
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year marriage, they purchased no major household appliances, furniture, or 
automobiles (R. at 442-43), There were no children born as issue of this 
marriage (R. at 260), and Mrs, Carlton is some 15 years younger than 
Mr. Carlton (R. at 330), who was a few days away from his 65th birthday at 
the trial of the trial (R. at 331). Therefore, the personal-circumstance 
factors also militate strongly in favor of restoring to Mr. Carlton his pre-
marital assets. 
While Mrs. Carlton sold a residence and beauty shop business in 
Wyoming prior to the marriage (see, supra at 15-16), it was also her 
testimony that the economic conditions in Wyoming had deteriorated, that she 
could not make a living in Wyoming (R. at 84), where there was "a beauty 
shop on every cornerM (R. at 97). Accordingly, it is apparent that she gave 
up little if anything of value for this marriage. This factor indicates that 
Mr. Carlton's pre-marital assets should have been restored to him. 
Finally, it was Mr. Carlton's undisputed testimony that the 
appreciation that had occurred during the marriage in his pre-marital assets, 
which consisted mostly of stocks and securities, was as a result of passive 
investment rather than any joint effort of the parties during the marriage. 
(R. at 142.) Accordingly, this is not a case in which the appreciation of pre-
marital assets that occurred during the marriage was the product of some 
joint effort by the spouses. This factor strongly suggests that the 
appreciation as well as the pre-marital assets themselves should have been 
awarded to Mr. Carlton. 
Appreciation in pre-marital property can be considered a marital 
asset only if it is both the product of the spouses' joint efforts during the 
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marriage and a real and meaningful increase in value. As demonstrated in the 
foregoing paragraphs, any passive appreciation that may have occurred with 
respect to Mr. Carlton's pre-marital assets during this marriage was not a 
result of joint efforts to which Mrs. Carlton contributed. Moreover, the 
undisputed evidence before the trial court clearly demonstrated that there was 
no real overall appreciation in Mr. Carlton's pre-marital assets during the 
marriage. Thus, for both reasons, the trial court's property distribution 
cannot be justified as an attempt to distribute appreciation perceived by the 
trial court to be part of the marital estate. 
In this case, the evidence at trial demonstrates that there was 
little, if any, real increase in the net value of Mr. Carlton's pre-marital 
assets during the marriage. This determination can be made only by 
comparing the aggregate value of his pre-marital assets at the time of the 
marriage with the aggregate value of those assets at the termination of the 
marriage. In order to make this comparison meaningful, the aggregate values 
at both times must be expressed in comparable terms. Thus, logic compels 
adjustment of the values to compensate, inter alia, for the pernicious effects 
of inflation. This is particularly important in a case, such as the present, 
where the pre-martial assets were accumulated and held by an older person to 
provide a source of living expenses and enjoyment during the retirement years 
when employment income will, inevitably, diminish. 
In this case, it was undisputed that the cost of living, as 
measured by the Federal government's Consumer Price Index, had resulted in 
a substantial diminution in the purchasing power of the dollar during the 
5-1/2 years of this marriage. (See. Exhibit 30-D, received R. at 334, 
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reproduced infra at A-24 through A-25.) In order to have maintained the 
same real purchasing power, Mr. Carlton would have had to have had, at the 
time that the marriage ended, $1.45 in assets for every $1.00 that he had at 
the beginning of the marriage. Thus, Mr. Carlton would have needed more 
than $1,100,000.00 in assets at the time of trial to have been in the same 
position financially as he was at the time of the marriage in June of 1979, 
when he had $761,925.00 in assets. (See. Exhibit 35-D, reproduced infra at 
A-26.) 
Notwithstanding the substantial diminution in purchasing power 
that had occurred during the marriage, the trial court expressly refused to 
consider this factor in determining "the equities in this marital estate." 
(Findings, paragraph 10, R. at 187, infra, at A-5.) Accordingly, the trial 
court thus further erred by refusing to consider relevant evidence necessary 
to an appropriate determination of what property properly constituted the 
marital estate of these parties and how that marital estate should be 
distributed. 
The appreciation in pre-marital assets that occurred during this 
marriage does not constitute a marital asset subject to division both because 
that appreciation was not the result of the joint efforts of the parties and 
because there was no real appreciation at all when the values of 
Mr. Carlton's pre-marital assets are expressed in comparable terms by 
adjusting for the decrease in purchasing power resulting from inflation during 
the tenure of the marriage. 
Under such circumstances, the trial court was, under firmly 
established Utah law, obligated to distribute the parties' assets in such a way 
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that each received essentially the pre-marital assets contributed to the 
marriage together with any appreciation that occurred during the marriage 
attributable to those assets. The only marital estate subject to distribution 
was those assets that the parties, working together during the marriage, had 
created. Since the trial court failed to make any effort to segregate and 
value those assets which properly constituted the marital estate, the property 
distribution is erroneous and must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court in a domestic relations action is required to enter 
Findings of Fact that are sufficiently specific to enable the trial court to 
identify and fairly evaluate the parties' assets. In this case, the Findings of 
Fact entered by the trial court are totally devoid of the required specificity. 
As a result, the trial court was unable to distinguish between Mr. Carlton's 
pre-marital assets (which should have been awarded to him) and those marital 
assets that would have been subject to distribution. Under these 
circumstances, the action must be remanded to the trial court for the purpose 
of making and entering appropriate Findings sufficient to permit the trial 
court to fashion an equitable property distribution and sufficient to permit 
this Court to review that distribution. 
The trial court erred in attempting to distribute to Mrs. Carlton 
a substantial interest in the pre-marital assets and financial holdings 
possessed by Mr. Carlton at the time of the marriage. Neither those pre-
marital assets nor the appreciation in value in those assets that occurred 
during the marriage resulted from or was contributed to by the joint efforts 
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of the parties. As such, they did not constitute marital assets and it was 
error for the trial court to award any substantial portion of those pre-marital 
assets to Mrs. Carlton. The inequitable property distribution fashioned by the 
trial court in this case is contrary to Utah law and must be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of February, 1987. 
DART, ADAMSON & PARKEN 
By 
B. L. Dart 
By 
John D. Parken 
Counsel for Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo-
VERLORA CARLTON, : 
Plaintiff, : FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
v. : 
FRANK HAYDEN CARLTON, : Civil No. D-84-4686 
Defendant. : Judge Jay E. Banks 
ooOoo 
This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 18th 
and 19th days of December, 1985, before the Honorable Jay E. 
Banks, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court, Plaintiff 
appearing in person and by and through her attorney, Paul H. 
Liapis, and Defendant appearing in person and by and through his 
attorney, B. L.^Part, and the parties having been duly sworn and 
examined under oath, and documentary evidence having been marked 
and received by the Court, and more than three months having 
elapsed since the filing of Plaintiff's Complaint, and the Court 
having heard the arguments of counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant 
and having inquired into the legal sufficiency of the evidence so 
adduced, and being fully advised in the premises, and the Court 
having taken the same under advisement and having met with 
counsel in chambers on the 11th day of July, 1986, and having 
rendered his decision, does now make, adopt and find the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant were bona fide and actual 
residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for more than three 
months immediately prior to the filing of the Complaint herein, 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife, having 
been married on the 18th day of June, 1979, in Garden City, Utah, 
and having separated in December, 1984• 
3. No children have been born as issue of this marriage, 
and none are expected. 
A. On numerous occasions prior to the filing of 
Plaintiff's Complaint herein, Defendant treated Plaintiff 
cruelly, causing great mental distress and suffering in that, 
among other things, Defendant was associating with other women, 
has lied to Plaintiff and has caused numerous arguments between 
the parties, all of which has destroyed the feelings of love and 
affection once held by Plaintiff for Defendant, causing this 
marriage to exist in name only. 
5* On numerous occasions prior to the filing of 
Defendant's Counterclaim herein, Plaintiff treated Defendant 
cruelly, causing great mental distress and suffering in that, 
among other things, Plaintiff harassed Defendant and left the 
2 ^*P 
A-3 GO^' 
Defendant upon his return from Wyoming, all of which has 
destroyed the feelings of love and affection once held by 
Defendant for Plaintiff, causing this marriage to exist in name 
only. 
6. The Court finds that the Plaintiff brought into the 
marriage furniture, furnishings and appliances; horse equipment; 
a 1977 Cordova automobile; real property located at Saratoga, 
Wyoming; a hair business and equipment; an IRA account and 
personal effects and belongings. 
7. The Court finds that the Defendant brought in to the 
marriage a duplex located at 573 K Street, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
Bear Lake property; a lot in Oakley; a 1977 Cordova automobile; a 
1977 Chrysler Wagon; various stocks and bonds which Defendant 
listed separately from those acquired during the marriage; an 
accounting practice; a horse; and his personal effects and 
belongings. 
8. The Court finds that the parties, during the course of 
their marriage, have acquired the following personal property the 
1984 Lincoln; shocks and bonds in an investment account with E. 
F. Hutton Investment Company; accumulations to Plaintiff and 
Defendant's IRA account and Defendant's KEOGH Plan; numerous bank 
accounts; Certificates of Deposit; 6 bronze sculptures and 
accumulations to the Defendant's retirement account. 
9. The Court finds that the parties acquired a one-half 
interest in a subdivision in Carbon County, Wyoming, a lot in 
c Co^
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Saratoga, Wyoming, and that there has been a sizeable 
appreciation in the home which Defendant brought into the 
marriage* The Court has considered the appraisals received from 
both Plaintiff and Defendant, and has averaged the appraisals of 
their experts to arrive at the value and appreciation in the 
property on K Street. 
10. The Court finds that the Defendant has failed to 
convince the Court as to any need to apply a cost of living 
percentage to the assets Defendant brought into the marriage 
before making a determination as to the equities in this marital 
estate. 
11. The Court finds that the respective IRA Accounts of 
both Plaintiff and Defendant should be offset against one 
another. 
12. The Court finds that the acquisition of the new 
automobile by Defendant and the value of the 1977 Cordova 
automobile driven by the Plaintiff are an offset and that each 
should be awarded those assets. The Court further finds that the 
parties disposed of Plaintiff's Cordova automobile and Plaintiff 
used the Defendants Cordova automobile during the marriage. 
13. The Court finds that the marital appreciation in the 
assets which the parties acquired during the marriage and/or 
maintained during the marriage, totals $255,327.00. The Court 
finds that the Plaintiff brought into the marriage and should 
receive assets totalling $27,228.00, which sum should be taken 
away from the appreciated asset figure above, leaving an adjusted 
marital estate of $228,099.00. The Court further finds that the 
Plaintiff is entitled to one-half of said amounts, or 
$114,049.00. In addition, Plaintiff should have the value and 
assets she brought into the marriage of $27,228.00, for a total 
estate to be awarded to her of $141,277.00. 
14. The Court finds that at the time of the separation in 
this matter, Plaintiff took with her, less her IRA accounts and 
appreciation, assets worth $12,041.00, which should be deducted 
from the $141,277.00 sums, leaving a balance of $129,236.00, 
which should be awarded to the Plaintiff as her share of the 
marital estate. The Court finds that the two Sandia Federal bank 
accounts Nos. 08-24002119 and 08-7080911-2 in
 vthe respective sums-
of $17,929.32 and $16,508.32, and the Valley Bank checking 
account No. 01-02-2113 in the sum of $5,845.00 should be divided 
equally between the parties, with Plaintiff's share of $20,111.71 
to be credited against the amount owed Plaintiff of $129,236.00 
The Court findsM:hat Plaintiff should also be awarded the 
Saratoga lot valued at $10,000.00 and that the remaining sum of 
$99,124.29 awarded Plaintiff should be paid to her by the 
transfer of stocks and bonds held by the parties in the E. F. 
Hutton Investment account equal to that sum of money, with said 
transfer to occur on or before Friday, July 25, 1986. 
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15. The Court finds that the Defendant had paid Plaintiff 
alimony during the pendency of this matter and has included said 
payments into the property calculations set forth above* 
16. The Court finds that the Plaintiff, at the time of the 
Trial, was employed at Life Like Styles For Men, with a gross 
income of $800.00 per month and a net income of $638.00. 
17. The Court finds that the Defendant, at the time of the 
Trial in this matter and based upon his adjusted gross income for 
1983 as set out in his Financial Declaration Form, found that the 
Defendants gross income was $9,273.00 per month and his net 
income was $5,306.00 per month. 
18. The Court finds that the parties have outstanding debts 
and obligations as follows: The first mortgage on the K Street 
property, a loan to the Plaintiff's mother and debts that each of 
the parties had incurred since their separation. 
19. The Court finds that both Plaintiff and Defendant have 
incurred attorney's fees in connection with this matter. 
20. The Court finds that Defendant has failed to convince 
the Court that Defendant should be given any credit for a 
decrease or loss in value of the Bear Lake property during the 
course of the marriage, nor that any such loss should decrease 
the marital assets. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
adopts its: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded a Decree of 
Divorce# one from the other, upon the grounds of mental cruelty, 
with said Decree to become final upon signing and entry of the 
Decree of Divorce herein. 
2. The home located at 573 K Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
be and the same is hereby awarded to the Defendant as his sole 
and separate property and free and clear of any interest of the 
Plaintiff. Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all debts and 
obligations associated with said home and to hold the Plaintiff 
harmless therefrom. 
3. Plaintiff is awarded as her sole and separate property 
the lot in Saratoga, Wyoming, free and clear of any interest of 
the Defendant, subject to the taxes owing against said property* 
4. Defendant is awarded as his sole and separate property 
the one-half interest in the subdivision in Carbon County, 
Wyoming, free and clear of any interest of the Plaintiff and 
subject to any taxes or obligations owing thereon, and the Bear 
Lake property in Fish Haven, Idaho. 
5. Plaintiff's right of alimony from Defendant is 
terminated. 
6. Defendant is awarded as his sole and separate property 
the 1984 Lincoln automobile, together with the obligation owing 
thereon; the Chrysler Wagon and the 1967 One-Ton truck; the 
furniture, furnishings, fixtures in his possession; his IRA 
7 ^ r\3*^ 
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accounts; his Tracy Collins Tax Conference Committee account No* 
71-29-162-9; his Tracy Collins checking account No. 71-24-049-3; 
the Valley Bank 60-month Certificate of Deposit; the Valley Bank 
Money Market -01-07-9727; the Valley Bank savings account No. 
21-113818; the United Saving account No. 0310518089; the 6 bronze 
sculptures known as First Jump Out, When Ropes Were Trouble, 
Winter Help, On The Hook, For Thirty A Month and Between Right 
and Wrong; his accounting business assets and obligations 
associated therewith; and his personal effects and belongings. 
7. Plaintiff is awarded as her sole and separate property 
the 1977 Cordova automobile; her IRA account; the furniture, 
furnishings, fixtures and appliances presently in her possession; 
the Pagosa Bond in her name; the 100 shares of Utah Power & Light 
Stock; the 100 shares of Arizona Power Stock; her E. F. Hutton 
Investment Account; her First Security checking account; the gray 
mare horse; and her personal effects and belongings* 
8. Plaintiff and Defendant are ordered to divide equally 
the Sandia Federal Bank Account No. 08-24002119 in the sum of 
$17,929.32; the Sandai Saving Account No. 08-7080911-2 in the sum 
of $16,508*32; and the Valley Bank checking account No. 
01-02-211-3 in the sum of $5,845.00, with said division to occur 
forthwith. 
9. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the Defendant as 
a property settlement the sum of $141,277.00. Said sum is to be 




said amount for the stocks and bonds which Plaintiff took with 
her at the time of separation; $20,111.71 representing 
Plaintiff1s one-half of the two Sandia Federal Bank Accounts and 
the Valley Bank checking account; $10,000.00 for the value of the 
Saratoga lot in Wyoming; and the transfer by Defendant to 
Plaintiff of stocks and bonds equal in current dollar value to 
the remaining sum of $99,124,29. Said stocks and bonds should be 
transferred to the Plaintiff on or before the 25th day of July, 
1986. 
10. Plaintiff should assume and pay and hold the Defendant 
harmless therefrom the following debts and obligations: The loan 
to her mother and any debts and obligations she has incurred in 
her own name since the filing of the Complaint in this matter. 
11. Defendant should assume and pay and hold the Defendant 
harmless therefrom the following debts and obligations: The 
debts and obligations associated with the K Street property, his 
business and debts or obligations he has incurred in his own name 
since the filing of the Complaint in this matter. 
12. Plaint.iff and Defendant are each awarded their own IPA 
accounts, together with all appreciate therein and the Defendant 
is awarded his KEOGH Plan, together with all appreciation 
therein. 
13. Defendant's request that the marital estate be 
decreased by the drop in value of the Bear Lake Property is 
denied. 
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14. Defendant's request that a cost of living appreciation 
be applied to those assets which he brought into the marriage, 
before division, is denied. 
15. The parties are each awarded as their sole and separate 
property, to do with as they choose, the life insurance policies 
presently in force on their life. 
16. The parties should each assume and pay their own 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in this matter. 
17. The parties are ordered to execute any and all 
documents necessary to carry forth the intent of this Order. 
, 1986. DATED this . j ^ Z ^ d a y of 
BY THE COURT: 
JKY/^Z BANKS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
B. L. DART 
Attorney for Defendant 
10 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed, postage pre-paid, to B. L. Dart, 310 South 
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ByJEli 
PAUL H. LIAPIS - 1956 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 532-6996 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
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FRANK HAYDEN CARLTON, 
Defendant. 
7 T* -n - * -^ 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. D-84-4686 
Judge Jay E. Banks 
•••• 00O00- — — 
This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 18th 
and 19th days of December, 1985, before the Honorable Jay E. 
Banks, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court, Plaintiff 
appearing in person and by and through her attorney, Paul H. 
Liapis, and Defendant appearing in person and by and through his 
attorney, B. L. Dart, and the parties having been duly sworn and 
examined under oath, and documentary evidence having been marked 
and received by the Court and more than three months having 
elapsed since the filing of Plaintiff's Complaint and the Court 
having heard the arguments of counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant 
and having inquired into the legal sufficiency of the evidence so 
incurred and being fully advised in the premises, and the Court 
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having taken the same under advisement and having met with 
counsel in chambers on the 11th day of July, 1986, and the Court 
having made and entered herein its written Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and upon motion of Paul H. Liapis of GUSTIN, 
ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS, attorneys for Plaintiff: 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. The Plaintiff and Defendant be and they are each hereby 
awarded a Decree of Divorce from the other upon the grounds of 
mental cruelty, and the marriage between Plaintiff and Defendant 
be and the same is hereby dissolved, and the parties are hereby 
free and absolutely released from the bonds of matrimony and all 
the obligations thereof with said Decree to become final upon 
signing and entry of the Decree of Divorce herein. 
2. The home located at 573 K Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
be and the same is hereby awarded to Defendant as his sole and 
separate property, free and clear of any interest of the 
Plaintiff, subject to his assumption of all debts and obligations 
against said property. 
3. Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded as her sole and 
separate property the lot in Saratoga, Wyoming, free and clear of 
any interest of the Defendant. Plaintiff should assume and pay 
the taxes owing against said property. 
4* Defendant be and he is hereby awarded as his sole and 
separate property the one-half interest in the subdivision in 
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Carbon County, Wyoming, free and clear of any interest of 
Plaintiff and subject to any debts and taxes owing thereon* 
5. Defendant be and is hereby awarded as his sole and 
separate property the Bear Lake property, free and clear of any 
interest of the Plaintiff and subject to any debts owing thereon. 
6. Plaintiff is not awarded any alimony from the 
Defendant and the same is terminated. 
7. Defendant be and he is hereby awarded as his sole and 
separate property the 1984 Lincoln automobile, together with the 
obligation owing thereon; the Chrysler Wagon and the 1967 One-Ton 
truck; the furniture, furnishings, fixtures in his possession; 
his IRA accounts; his Tracy Collins Tax Conference Committee 
account No. 71-29-162-9; his Tracy Collins checking account No. 
71-24-049-3; the Valley Bank 60-month Certificate of Deposit; the 
Valley Bank Money Market -01-07-9727; the Valley Bank savings 
account No. 21-113818; the United Saving account No. 0310518089; 
the 6 bronze sculptures known as First Jump Out, When Ropes Were 
Trouble, Winter Help, On The Hook, For Thirty A Month and Between 
Right and Wrong; his accounting business assets and obligations 
associated therewith; and his personal effects and belongings. 
8. Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded as her sole and 
separate property the 1977 Cordova automobile; her IRA account; 
the furniture, furnishings, fixtures and appliances presently in 
her possession; the Pagosa Bond in her name; the 100 shares of 
Utah Power & Light Stock; the 100 shares of Arizona Power Stock; 
3 
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her E. P. Hutton Investment Account; her First Security checking 
account; the gray mare horse; and her personal effects and 
belongings. 
9. Plaintiff and Defendant are each hereby ordered to 
divide equally the Sandia Federal Bank Account No. 08-24002119 in 
the sum of $17,929.32; the Sandai Saving Account No. 08-7080911-2 
in the sum of $16,508.32; and the Valley Bank checking account 
No. 01-02-211-3 in the sum of $5,845.00, with said division to 
occur forthwith. 
10. Plaintiff be and is hereby awarded judgment against the 
Defendant as a property settlement the sum of $141,277.00. Said 
sum is to be paid in the following manner: $12,041.00 is to be 
deducted from said amount for the stocks and bonds which 
Plaintiff took with her at the time of separation; $20,111.71 
representing Plaintiff's one-half of the two Sandia Federal Bank 
Accounts and the Valley Bank checking account; $10,000.00 for the 
value of the Saratoga lot in Wyoming; and the transfer by 
Defendant to Plaintiff of stocks and bonds equal in current 
dollar value to the remaining sum of $99,124.29. Said stocks and 
bonds should be transferred to the Plaintiff on or before the 
25th day of July, 1986. 
11. Plaintiff and Defendant be and they are each hereby 
awarded their own IRA accounts, together with all appreciation 
therein and the Defendant is awarded his KEOGH Plan, together 
with all appreciation therein. 
4 ~A*J 
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12. Defendant's request that a cost of living appreciation 
be applied to those assets which he brought into the marriagef 
before division, be and the same is hereby denied. 
13. Defendants request that the marital estate be 
decreased by the drop in value of the Bear Lake property be and 
the same is hereby denied 
14. The parties be and they are each hereby awarded as 
their sole and separate property, to do with as they choose, the 
life insurance policies presently in force on their life. 
15. Plaintiff be and is hereby ordered to assume and hold 
Defendant harmless therefrom the following obligations: The 
loan to her mother and any debts and obligations she has incurred 
in her own name since the filing of the Complaint in this matter. 
16. Defendant be and is hereby ordered t^o assume and hold 
Plaintiff harmless therefrom the following obligations: The 
debts and obligations associated with the K Street property, his 
business and any debts or obligations he has incurred in his own 
name since the filing of the Complaint in this matter. 
17. The parties be and they are each hereby ordered to 
assume and pay their own attorney's fees and costs incurred 
herein. 
18. The parties be and they are each hereby ordered to do 
and perform all the matters and things required by each of them 
to be done herein. 
A-17 G'^ 
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DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
B. L. DART 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed, postage pre-paid, to B. L. Dart, 310 South 





B. L. DART (818) \l Uv^Vfe 
Attorney for Defendant K J U U V ^ V ^ / 
Suite 1330 U 
310 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Otah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 





FRANK HAYDEN CARLTON, 
Defendant. 
OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS 
AND DECREE 
Civil No. D84-4686 
Judge Banks 
oooOooo 
Defendant by his attorney, B. L. Dart, hereby objects 
to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by 
plaintiff's attorney in the following particulars: 
1. Defendant objects to the second sentence of 
paragraph 12 of the Findings of Fact in that there was no finding 
made by the court that defendant gifted his Cordoba automobile to 
the plaintiff during the marriage. 
2. Defendant objects to the Finding of Fact paragraph 
13 in which there is a finding that there has been an 
appreciation in marital assets of $255,327 for the reason that 
the basis by which the Court reached this conclusion is not set 
1
 * < * * 
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forth, and as such the finding is not sufficient. This finding 
is further objected to on the basis that the calculations as 
stated do not accurately compute. 
3. Defendant objects to the Finding of Fact paragraph 
15, the second sentence of which should be deleted since it 
attempts to insert information into the case post-trial* 
4« Defendant objects to paragraph 6 of the 
Conclusions of Law in that the 60-month certificate of deposit 
with Valley Bank is the same account as Account #21-105264 with 
Valley Bank* As prepared, the conclusion appears to create more 
accounts than exist. 
5* Defendant objects to paragraph 15 of the 
Conclusions of Law in that nowhere is it shown that defendant has 
been given credit for temporary alimony suras paid by plaintiff 
during the pendency of this action. As such the final clause of 
this conclusion of law is objectionable. 
6. Defendant further objects to the Decree of Divorce 
insofar as it carries forward the items objected to above in the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
DATED this 28th day of July, 1986. 
B. L. DART 
2 _ ^ < ? * 
A-20 0/^iJ*" 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of July, 1986, I 
a copy of the foregoing Objections to Findings and Decree 
Paul H. Liapis 
48 Post Office Place 
Third floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 




ITEMS OWNED BY PLAINTIFF PRIOR TO MARRIAGE 
Verlora Carlton v. Frank Hayden Carlton 
A. Horse Equipment: 
Saddle and blanket; one pair of stirrups (wide, heavy ones 
on Frank's present saddle); and spurs. 
B. Household Items: 
Kirby vacuum cleaner and attachments; covered wagon lamp; 
ceramic cowboy sculpture; one pair of mounted longhorn wall 
ornaments; a framed ink-print picture of a little boy, horse 
and dog; and two rugs - one Mexican woven and one Navajo 
woven, black, gray and off-white. 
C. Furnishings: 
Ceramic covered wagon cookie jar; a set of carving knives; 
two sets of western glasses; one set of small brandy type 
glasses; a tree cup and stoneware cups in cupboard; and two 
pillows. 
D. Personal Items: 
A step scraper; two pair of golf shoes; miscellaneous 
clothes and shoes; and three pairs of cowboy boots. 
IRA account - $3,918.72; home in Saratoga, Wyoming, net sale 
proceeds $10,035.60; and sale of Plaintiff's beautician 
equipment and business - $7,000.00.* 
E. Furniture owned prior to the marriage - given to Plaintiff's 
children on Defendant's instructions. 
Said cash assets were used to acquire the following items: 
1. Pagosa Water and Sanitation Tax Free Bonds, value 
$5,000.00. 
2. 100 shares Utah Power and Light, value $2,550.00. 
3. 100 shares Arizona Public Service, value $2,433.00. 
4. E. F. Hutton Money Management Fund, value $468.00. 
A-22 
SEPARATE ASSETS OF VERLORA CARLTON AT MARRIAGE AND AT SEPARATION 
Marriage 
6/79 
Pagosa Water & Sanitation 
Utah Power & Light 
Arizona Public Service 
Valley Bank IRA 
United Savings IRA (Fin. decl.) $ 3,918 
Automobile (Depo pll) 4,500 
Sale of business (Depo p8) 7,000 
Sale of home (Depo plO) 10,035 
\* DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBff 
Adjustment for loss of 
buying power resulting from 

















SERVICER Utah Department 
of Employment Security 
A DIVISION OF THF INDU^TRIAl COMN'I '^ ION ^> I TAn 
December 18, 1985 
32:KJ 
Commission Ch^irnic 
W.iltnr T Axplgai 
Commission 
Lonice L Nielsf 
Commission 
B.L. Dart 
310 South Main 
Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Dear Mr. Dirt: 
In reply to your request, comparisons of the purchasing power of the dollar 
in different time periods may be calculated with Consumer Price Index statistics 
from the attached table. The effect of inflation on the value of the dollar 
from June 1979 to December 1984 may be calculated as follows: 
December 1984 CPI-U 315.5 
July 1579 CPI-U = 7IO = 1.457 
1.000 . f-nc 
057 " -686 
Thus, in December 1984, the purchasing power of the dollar was $.686 with 
respect to June 1979 dollars. 
Looking at the same problem from a different angle: 
A market based selection of goods and services costing $100 in June 
1979, would cost $145.70 in December 1984. 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































-U = CPI for all urban consumers. «W * CPI for urban wage earners and clerical workers 
Source: Prepared by the Utah Oepartment of Employment Security from tabulations published by Bureau of Labor Statistics. United States Department of Labor. 




Nancy Carlton Note -0- $ 24,688 
Duplex—573 K Street $116,000 122,000 
(Webber appraisal) 
Increase in value by mortgage 
deduction 8,387 
Bear Lake Lot 300,000 200,000 
($240,000 land/$60,000 cabin—1979) 
$120,000 land/$80,000 cabin—1984) 
Stock/securities—premarriage 137,235 210,900 
(See Exhibit A attached) 
Stocks/securities acquired 




(Exhibit D) 130,675 83,458 
Retirement Accounts 
(Tax adjusted) (Exhibit D) 
Bronzes (Exhibit E) 
Vehicles (Exhibit F) 















Adjustment for loss of buying 
power resulting from inflation 
6/79 to 12/84 x 1.45 
i DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT 
$ 1 , 1 0 4 , 7 9 1 $ 8 3 7 , 7 3 2 
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